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ABSTRACT. In 1976, Inuit leaders in what is now Nunavut began the long process that led to a comprehensive land claim to regain
control of their lives and land. Previously, they had seen their economic, social, political, educational, and belief systems
diminished and the people disempowered by the imposition of Western systems, structures, and practices. To reverse the existing
relations, Inuit leaders had to call upon the ideologies and institutions of the dominant society—a process greatly misunderstood
by Inuit harvesters and others within the communities. The disconnect between Inuit harvesters’ expectations of the Nunavut Land
Claim Agreement (NLCA) and the realities experienced in the communities have made ocean resource management a site of
growing resistance in the North. Common misconceptions were that the Nunavut Government would be an Inuit government and
that land-claim “compensation” would involve per capita distributions and injections of cash into the hunters and trappers’
organizations. Instead, communities were expected to abide by the decisions of the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board—a
tripartite joint-management arrangement between the federal and territorial governments and Inuit organizations—and to
cooperate with the increasing demands from government departments and science researchers for local information and
participation. The community response to these impositions was to obscure the gaze of inquiring governments and outsiders
through creative acts of resistance. To mediate the situation, increased involvement from federal and territorial resource managers
in terms of support, capacity building, information exchange, and federal/territorial/community relationship building is
encouraged.
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RÉSUMÉ. En 1976, les leaders inuits de la région qui s’appelle maintenant le Nunavut ont amorcé ce long processus qui les a
menés à une revendication territoriale d’envergure pour reprendre leurs vies et leurs terres en mains. Avant cela, leurs systèmes
économique, social, politique et scolaire de même que leur système de croyances avaient été diminués au point où le peuple se
sentait affaibli par l’imposition de pratiques, de structures et de systèmes occidentaux. Pour renverser les relations qui existaient
à ce moment-là, les leaders inuits ont dû faire appel aux idéologies et aux institutions de la société dominante — un processus que
les Inuits qui récoltent les ressources et d’autres membres de la collectivité ont eu bien du mal à comprendre. En raison de la
différence entre les attentes des Inuits qui récoltent les ressources à l’égard de l’Accord sur les revendications territoriales du
Nunavut (ARTN) et les réalités vécues dans les collectivités, la gestion des ressources océaniques est devenue un enjeu de plus
en plus important dans le Nord. Parmi les idées fausses véhiculées, notons le fait que le gouvernement du Nunavut aurait été un
gouvernement inuit et que la « compensation » au titre des revendications territoriales aurait pris la forme de distributions par
habitant et d’injections de capital destinées aux organismes de chasse et de pêche. À la place, les collectivités ont été obligées
d’obéir aux décisions du Conseil de gestion des ressources fauniques du Nunavut — un groupe de gestion tripartite composé des
gouvernements fédéral et territorial de même que d’organismes inuits — et de faire preuve de coopération vis-à-vis des exigences
croissantes de divers ministères et chercheurs scientifiques en quête d’information et de participation dans la région. La réaction
de la collectivité à l’égard de ces impositions a consisté à embrouiller l’insistance des gouvernements et d’autres parties en
organisant des actes de résistance créatifs. Afin d’arbitrer la situation, on encourage une plus grande participation de la part des
gestionnaires fédéraux et territoriaux de ressources en matière de soutien, de renforcement des capacités, d’échange de
l’information et de formation de relations entre le secteur fédéral, le secteur territorial et le secteur communautaire.
Mots clés : Nunavut, Inuit, collectivités côtières, gestion de l’océan, résistance
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INTRODUCTION
Comaroff and Comaroff (1991:15) say that “the essence of
colonization inheres less in political overrule than in seizing
and transforming ‘others’ by the very act of conceptualizing,
inscribing, and interacting with them on terms not of their
choosing; in making them into the pliant objects and silenced
subjects of our scripts and scenarios.” However, the domi-
nant society never totally succeeds in removing the vitality
from indigenous systems. Instead, pre-existing systems
constantly spring up, challenging and remaking the dominant
power relations. This transformation may be done in open
defiance, through imaginative feats of cultural subversion, or
through a quiet, brooding resistance (Scott, 1985, 1990;
Kulchyski, 1992).
This paper contexualizes and discusses some of the
situations, government policies, and Inuit perceptions of
their land claim that influence the current resistance to
ocean co-management within the Kivalliq (formerly
Keewatin) region of Nunavut.
Thomas Suluk is a beneficiary of the 1993 Nunavut Land
Claims Agreement (NLCA) and a lifelong resident of Arviat,
Nunavut. He spent more than 17 years involved in land
claims. During that time, he served as an interpreter for the
Nunavut project, interpreting complex concepts such as
“land claims” and “aboriginal rights” to the communities
and reinterpreting community responses back to govern-
ment. He was also a chief land-claim negotiator for the Inuit
Tapirisat of Canada; the member of Parliament instrumental
in the division of the Northwest Territories; an executive in
the Tunngavik Federation of Nunavut, charged with setting
up the future government of Nunavut; and a trustee for the
Nunavut Trust. Much of this paper is a firsthand account of
his experiences during the land-claim process and as a
current resident living under the NLCA.
Sherrie Blakney, a PhD candidate at the University of
Manitoba, did her doctoral research on Inuit well-being and
its connection to the land. During 2004, Blakney lived with
traditional Inuit harvesters in Arviat, participating in hunting,
fishing, trapping, and inland excursions and conversing with
members of the local hunters and trappers’ organization. In
the following years, she worked with Inuit leaders, land-
claim organizations, and the federal government to mediate
tensions and strengthen federal/Inuit working relations. To-
day, both authors are with Fisheries and Oceans Canada,
Central and Arctic Region, working to strengthen Inuit in-
volvement in decision making for ocean management.
The first sections, including the vignettes, are outcomes
of Blakney’s doctoral work, while the sections beginning
with “The NLCA—Reversing Existing Relations” are
outcomes of Suluk’s involvement with land claims and
politics and as a resident of Nunavut. The final section,
“Legacy of Non-Integrated Management…” combines the
work and reflections of both authors.
BACKGROUND TO RESISTANCE: THE SOCIO-
CULTURAL HISTORY OF KIVALLIQ (KEEWATIN)
In 1921, Prime Minister Arthur Meighen advised his
colleagues that the Government of Canada’s policy toward
the Inuit should be to “…leave them alone. They are in a
latitude where no-one will ever bother them.” But Charles
Stewart, the minister of the Interior, disagreed: “I am not
asking that the Eskimos be…made wards of the govern-
ment, nor is my desire…to make them dependent on the
people of Canada for a livelihood. But white men are going
amongst them; the missionaries are beginning to require
education for their children…” (Duffy, 1988:6).
In fact, Europeans and their descendants had been going
among Inuit and altering their livelihood for quite some
time (Birket-Smith, 1933; Van Stone and Oswalt, 1959).
From the 14th century onward, Inuit lives were influenced
by explorers, whalers, traders, missionaries, and govern-
ment administrators. Families were encouraged to alter
their subsistence harvesting strategies and focus on
nontraditional furs and marine products for European and
southern markets. Traditional settlement practices were
altered as Inuit were relocated nearer to trapping areas
favourable to supplying European product demands. Trad-
ing posts established nearby to provide Inuit with firearms,
mechanical equipment, and supplies created a dependency
on trade goods (Brody, 1975, 2000; Damas, 2002).
Canada was becoming concerned about the growing de-
pendency of Inuit on the  imported goods and rudimentary
health care offered at the trading posts and feared that epi-
demics would increase as Inuit clustered around these centres
(Damas, 2002). Thus, until the 1950s, Canada’s policy to-
ward the Inuit was to disperse and relocate them and keep
them self-sufficient on the land. Some family groups in the
Keewatin were relocated as many as three times in “acts of
social reform” to keep Inuit from clustering around the posts
and inland weather stations (Marcus, 1995).
When family allowances came into existence in 1944,
northern administrators feared that Inuit would stop hunt-
ing because the allowances often represented more cash
than a family’s entire annual income from trapping (Damas,
2002). Family allowances were therefore given out only
when food supplies were scarce. Yet children still became
major sources of income and were often adopted by older
childless couples with limited means of support, altering
Inuit family and social structures (Guemple, 1979; Tester
and Kulchyski, 1994).
During the 1950s, centralization became inevitable.
Caribou populations receded, the fox pelt market col-
lapsed, and inland trading posts closed, causing severe
hardship for Keewatin Inuit, who increasingly gathered
around the coastal posts for relief, family allowances, and
pensions. Although many families were attracted to the
education, health, and social programs, subsidized hous-
ing, wage employment, and the opportunity for gradual
acquisition of urban goods (Brody, 1975; Damas, 2002),
other family groups were compelled by government to
move to coastal areas for relief and monitoring.
Government hoped that if they divided the inland fami-
lies and dispersed them among the coastal families, the
inland Inuit would learn different subsistence strategies
and quickly adapt to their new setting. But southern inter-
vention did not have the positive outcomes that were
expected. Inland Inuit were expected to fish, hunt, and trap
in an unfamiliar area and to adhere to unfamiliar trapping,
fishing, and hunting regulations (Bankes, 2005; Kulchyski
and Tester, 2007). The removal of some traditional leaders
led to despondency, and social disruption ensued because
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factors important to the remaining Inuit, such as wildlife
resources, kinship networks, and group cohesiveness, were
not considered. Although inland and coastal Inuit were
settled together, the groups kept to themselves and inland
Inuit did not integrate into the coastal economy (Dailey
and Dailey, 1961; Williamson, 1974; Tester and Kulchyski,
1994). Every part of family and social life became regu-
lated by religious denominations (Ellis, 1966), and chil-
dren became alienated from the culture of their parents
through the imported educational system. Neither religion
nor education, however, was able to acculturate Inuit
children fully into Euro-Canadian society (Vallee, 1962).
Across the territory, a national political system imposed
its alien structure of individual rights and privileges,
communications networks, legal apparatus, military or-
ganization, and regulations governing land and resource
ownership upon Inuit (Duffy, 1988). As Euro-Canadians
came north to teach, heal, and administer, they achieved a
much higher standard of living than local Inuit, conse-
quently creating a two-class system exacerbated by a
language barrier and the self-containment of the Euro-
Canadian community (Vallee, 1968; Brody, 1975).
At the same time, the Canadian government was pressing
for development of the North’s nonrenewable resources,
and the Keewatin district became a focus of exploration and
the extraction of mineral resources. In the three decades that
preceded the land-claim settlement, Inuit saw their land
becoming a patchwork of mineral claims and leases. In-
creasingly, they viewed government and the mining indus-
try as partners who did not support Inuit in their concerns
and were not willing to allow serious input from them
(McPherson, 2003). Inuit maintain that they were never
consulted regarding these changes: their compliance was
assumed. Decisions made by the dominant society did not
reflect Inuit values and traditions and resulted in a distortion
of their society and a growing resistance. Thus, Inuit began
the long process that led toward a comprehensive land-
claim agreement and the creation of Nunavut Territory in
order to regain control of their land and their lives (Hicks
and White, 2000).
The NLCA, signed on 25 May 1993, was the largest and
most comprehensive land-claim agreement in Canada, cov-
ering 20% of Canada’s land mass. Under the agreement,
Inuit exchanged common-law aboriginal rights for title to
approximately 350 000 km2 of land, including 38 000 km2 of
mineral rights; priority harvesting rights for domestic, sport,
and commercial purposes; equal representation with gov-
ernment on the public boards established to manage the
wildlife, lands, waters, and offshore zone; capital transfer
payments of $1.148 billion; a 5% share of royalties from oil,
gas, and mineral development on Crown lands; the right to
negotiate with industry on surface-owned land for impact
mitigation from non-renewal resource development; repre-
sentative Inuit employment rates; and a $13-million train-
ing fund (NLCA, 1993). In addition, under the land claim’s
Nunavut Agreement, Canada committed itself to establish
Nunavut Territory by 1999.
With the settling of the Nunavut claim, government and
southern universities assumed that, given time to make
necessary adjustments to the new administration, the Inuit
would be willing to work out resource-management is-
sues. So why then, after 15 years, is there still such
resistance to the co-management regimes set up under the
claim? Why are so many older Inuit at the community level
discontent with their hard-won governmental structures?
Vignette I: The Nunavut Wildlife Harvest Study and the
“Occasional Hunters”
In accordance with the NLCA, the Nunavut Wildlife
Harvest Study (NWHS) was conducted throughout Nunavut
between June 1996 and May 2001 to determine baseline
harvesting data and basic needs of the communities. The
NWHS study designers were experienced northern re-
searchers and anticipated the possibility of “strategic bias”:
hunters could purposely under-report kills because of “a
misunderstanding of the study purpose and a fear that
results would be used to limit harvesting; a tendency for
Inuit hunters to under-report since they do not like to brag;
and a reluctance to report some species since historically
they have been illegal to hunt…Exaggeration of harvests
was thought to be very unlikely and was assumed not to
have occurred” (Priest and Usher, 2004:7). To alleviate
possible stress associated with reporting harvests, partici-
pation was voluntary, and the confidentiality of the indi-
vidual hunters was assured. Local fieldworkers categorized
hunters according to their activity: intensive hunters regu-
larly and repeatedly engaged in nearly all types of hunting
activities throughout the year; active hunters regularly
engaged in a limited number of harvesting activities dur-
ing the year; and occasional hunters participated in hunt-
ing activities irregularly, usually on day trips or weekend
outings (Priest and Usher, 2004:26). In some communi-
ties, such as Arviat and Rankin Inlet, occasional hunters
were not surveyed because of the sheer number of hunters
in this category (Tables 1 and 2), and study designers were
led to believe that this omission would not adversely affect
the outcome of the study. However, Inuit fieldworkers and
hunters who know the harvesting dynamics well did not
tell the study designers that many of those classified as
“occasional hunters” were mid- to upper-level govern-
ment workers who had the means to obtain high-powered
boats, skidoos, all-terrain vehicles, and rifles. Armed with
new equipment, it was not uncommon for “occasional
hunters” to harvest 8 to 10 belugas on a Saturday or an
evening after work. On the other hand, intensive hunters
usually represented the poor Inuit who had limited access
to cash income, good equipment, and fuel. Although they
hunted regularly, their harvesting capacity was small.
Vignette II: Co-management and the Communities
Under the NLCA, all marine and wildlife co-manage-
ment decisions are the responsibility of the Nunavut Wild-
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life Management Board (NWMB), and the NWMB requires
community hunters and trappers’ organizations (HTOs) to
record their annual beluga harvests and maintain those
records for two years. The records are collected annually by
a visiting federal fisheries officer. Although cooperation of
the HTOs is expected, they are not obligated to carry out the
NWMB decisions. Thus, the collection of harvesting data
from some communities is consistently problematic and is
often based on after-the-fact guesstimates. For example, a
federal fisheries officer who went to collect harvesting data
from the Arviat HTO in November 2003 was met instead by
a Government of Nunavut wildlife officer (a local Inuk),
who told her there were no harvesting records. Instead he
said he would make a list of possible hunters who might
have participated in the beluga hunt. The Fisheries and
Oceans Canada (DFO) officer was told the numbers could
not be verified because hunters had unlisted phone numbers,
and that she could not see the community freezer because it
had been cleaned out and the muktuk had been moved to
individual home freezers. The wildlife officer estimated
that 200 – 300 belugas had been harvested that summer, an
increase of 50%, in anticipation of a proposed deal with
northern Quebec to buy muktuk from Arviat hunters (Nel-
son, 2002). The fisheries officer then met with representa-
tives of the HTO, who claimed they were unaware of any
requirement to maintain harvest records. They stated that the
HTO had no harvest estimate and no records, but they agreed
to collect data for the 2004 harvest. However, in 2004, HTO
representatives informed the fisheries officer directly that
they refused to collect and maintain records or report harvests
(B. Guptil, DFO Rankin Inlet, pers. comm., 2005).
THE NLCA—REVERSING EXISTING RELATIONS
Inuit were living a nomadic lifestyle until formal educa-
tion for Inuit children and other attractions of permanent
settlements began to end this mode of living in the 1950s.
Until the early 1960s, Inuit had no accurate picture of
world history, of how North America was colonized, or
how the Canadian federation came to be. They knew
nothing about the gradual addition of new provinces.
Neither were they aware that, in reality, they had first been
“owned” by the Hudson’s Bay Company, which eventu-
ally sold its holdings—people included—to the new Do-
minion of Canada. Most Inuit were not aware that two
world wars had taken place and that Canada and other
nations were dealing with challenges related to returning
soldiers, war brides, and a baby boom. Only a few of the
early arrivals from the south, most notably the new reli-
gious leaders, spoke the local language. The first federal
day school in Arviat, staffed with English teachers direct
from England, was not built until 1959. It was not until
1964, when the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development took over the Department of National De-
fence’s abandoned military barracks in Fort Churchill,
Manitoba, that a unified education began to be provided to
the young Inuit from the Keewatin, Baffin Island, and
northern Quebec regions.
However, the last of the original Inuit nomads wanted
an option to retain their lifestyle, while at the same time
allowing their children to become “Westernized.” There-
fore, a sufficient period of resistance to total integration
was needed to ensure that Canada would recognize the
cultural need of Inuit to feel free. The Inuit thought that
settlement of land claims and the creation of a new terri-
tory designed to allow northern people to participate in
new development of their traditional homelands would be
the solution to this dilemma.
With some coincidental encouragement from the fed-
eral government during the Trudeau era, Inuit began the
task of identifying their own place in the Canadian federa-
tion. This involved a long dialogue between the North and
the South to define what the term “aboriginal rights”
meant. The federal position was that these rights did not
include the right to form an aboriginal government. How-
ever, the federal government’s refusal to recognize an
aboriginal right to self-government amounted to a refusal
to recognize the hunting practices of the Inuit. Conse-
quently, the Inuit changed their tactics and called for the
division of the Northwest Territories (NWT)—a plan that
had been on the back burner since 1961. Within the NWT,
Inuit represented a minority within a non-Inuit majority
and, as such, would not be able to affect policy in a way
that made sense to Inuit. In their own territory, however,
Inuit would compose a vast majority (approximately 85%)
and could effect changes to their governance.
During the land-claim years, the Inuit Tapirisat of
Canada (ITC)—the predecessor of Nunavut’s land-claim
corporation, Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. (NTI)—spent con-
siderable time consulting with each and every Nunavut
TABLE 1. Five-year average of registered hunters (hunting all
species) in Kivalliq’s three largest communities (adapted from
Priest and Usher, 2004).
Total Hunters Intensive Active Occasional
Arviat 410 6.2 69.2 311.4
Rankin Inlet 424 53.2 82.2 233.4
Repulse Bay 180 6 48.4 103
TABLE 2. Number of recorded beluga hunters in the three largest
Kivalliq coastal communities. It is not known how many of the
“occasional hunters” were involved in the beluga harvest (Priest
and Usher, 2004).
Year Arviat Rankin Inlet Repulse Bay
1996 39 20 13
1997 47 1 19
1998 30 5 11
1999 31 23 7
2000 28 20 2
Total hunters surveyed 87 50 38
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community to ascertain what should be included in their
land claim. The communities’ input had to be interpreted
into tangible proposals and, because the governments also
had to understand them, southern consultants and re-
searchers had to be hired to render these proposals into
“governmental” language. Thereafter, the government’s
replies had to be re-interpreted back to the ITC board,
which then deferred its decision to accept or reject until it
had consulted with the communities, a very time-consum-
ing process. In the absence of mass communication in the
North, Inuit did not know about the enormous amount of
work initiated by southern university researchers in sup-
port of land claims.
However, for Inuit living in what would become
Nunavut, time stood still. Canada’s free entry system for
prospectors and the increasing patchwork of mining claims
on Inuit traditional lands made ITC insist that there be no
economic development until the land claims were settled.
Social issues were put on hold. As a result of this stance,
the Inuvialuit and the Inuit of northern Quebec went their
separate ways.
COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES
NLCA and the Government of Nunavut
When the NLCA was settled (1993) and Nunavut became
a territory (1999), a minimum of accurate printed informa-
tion on what had happened at the political level was avail-
able in the communities. Inuit society and culture are based
on oral transmission: continuous face-to-face consultations
were required before the older generations could begin to
grasp the relevance of territorial and federal politics. But
after the land claim was settled, consultations ceased and the
misunderstandings grew. Most of the population had no
experience with the principles of comprehensive Western
agreements. Many people thought Nunavut to have an ad
hoc Inuit government, but closer scrutiny revealed that it
was really a recognized Canadian model similar to Alberta
and Saskatchewan. In a conversation with T. Suluk,
Ahiarmiut Elder Job Mounik (of Farley Mowat’s [1959]
The Desperate People) protested that this so-called “Inuit”
government was really a carbon copy of the old Government
of the NWT—that there was so much bureaucratic red tape,
no one in its departments could answer any of his questions,
but kept referring him to other departments. Never mind that
he was now being told that in Inuktitut! “Why then,” he
asked, “is the Government of Nunavut being referred to as
an Inuit government?” (conversation between T. Suluk and
J. Mounik, December 2005).
No matter how much the two agreements incorporated
within the NLCA were distinguished (i.e., the land claim
for Inuit beneficiaries and the Nunavut Agreement that
created the Nunavut Territory and its public government),
the older Inuit mind was unable to digest it. Only the
passage of time could resolve this distinction, so Inuit
leaders accepted that the “Inuit government” would exist
in name only. Nunavut’s constitution is still the same as
the previous Northwest Territories Act. It should therefore
come as no surprise that all the formal structures, proce-
dures, and practices of the NWT and Yukon territorial
legislatures are also seen in the Nunavut legislature, but
with Inuit trappings (e.g., Inuktitut names for Crown
Corporations). The creation of Nunavut was merely an
adjustment in the federal administration of the Arctic. The
three principal parties to the agreement saw it as an
alternative to the earlier calls by northern people for an
“Inuit government,” and after the transition things re-
mained stubbornly the same.
NLCA and Compensation
To many Inuit, attaining government status meant being
handed the keys to Canada’s financial coffers, along with
the ability to make edicts, a practice Canada does not
encourage (although it could have been useful for a time to
give older Inuit a sense of what governance means). Dis-
cussions by Inuit leaders on how to distribute the land-
claim money centred on several options: (1) splitting the
capital compensation amount three ways, according to the
number of people in each region of Nunavut. The compen-
sation money would be distributed to the Regional Inuit
Associations (RIAs), which would have the responsibility
of setting up their own regional corporations; (2) distrib-
uting the compensation to the RIAs and dividing it further
for the individual communities according to their popula-
tion size; (3) setting aside agreed amounts for regional or
local administration and leaving the decision on invest-
ment versus per capita distribution to the communities.
Under this scenario, each region would set its own timeta-
ble and budgets and formulate its own administrative
structures; or (4) hiring financial experts to invest the
money and maximize the financial returns, while funding
the three regional associations and their regional corpora-
tions with modest annual amounts ($500 000 – $1 000 000).
NTI and its regional affiliated organizations would share
most of the generated income. As Inuit leaders considered
the ability of communities to manage moderately large
amounts of money, they decided that Nunavut Inuit had
not attained sufficient competency in large financial mat-
ters. Basic formal education had arrived—sporadically—
only in the 1960s, and most Inuit had not yet grasped
Western concepts of budgeting, money management, and
financial accountability. Having considered the alterna-
tives, Inuit leaders decided to follow the fourth option and
direct the financial proceeds to a Nunavut investment
corporation, the Nunavut Trust Inc.
To ordinary Inuit, the very word “compensation” in
relation to the NLCA is misleading because there were no
per capita distributions, but only a few programs targeted
to specific Inuit groups, such as elders, hunters, or students
going on to higher education in the provinces. To make
matters worse, Nunavut Trust Inc. has been chiding the
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three regions of Nunavut for “excessive spending” through
these programs and “eroding” the $580 million yearly
federal transfer (Younger-Lewis, 2004, 2005a). Thus, in-
creasing the pressure to conform to non-Inuit financial
management priorities will keep the compensation forever
out of reach of the ordinary Inuk, for whose benefit the
land claim was designed.
NLCA and Co-Management Regimes
One of the main purposes of the NLCA was to provide
a buffer zone between Inuit and the outside world, but
while the claim was being negotiated, the formation of the
Government of Nunavut was not yet a given. Therefore, it
was decided that land-use and resource-management deci-
sions would be made by joint-management bodies, known
as Institutions of Public Government (IPGs), consisting of
equal representation from designated Inuit organizations,
the territorial government, and the federal government.
The NWMB was the first joint-management body created
to serve as a buffer between the government (federal and
territorial) and the original generation of Inuit hunters.
However, efforts to integrate northern and southern prin-
ciples on these boards met with questionable success. For
example, recent attempts by the NWMB to impose tough
new restrictions on hunters in the communities reveal that
the former decisions, guidelines, and regulations were
ineffective (Younger-Lewis, 2005b). As the NWMB at-
tempts to impose strict quotas on hunting certain caribou
herds and muskoxen and regulate the type of ammunition
and the use of dogs, NTI says that the NWMB proposals
violate the land-claim agreement (Thompson, 2006). Simi-
lar difficulties exist with other IPG boards. A management
review of the Nunavut Planning Commission (NPC) said
that “much of the policy material has been developed by
outsiders without meaningful internal input, and conse-
quently does not reflect the NPC needs or culture,” and
noted that many recommendations made by the partici-
pants in IPG workshops were “inconsistent with the
Nunavut Land Claim Agreement, and suggest a serious
lack of familiarity with the land claims environment”
(Aarluk Consulting Inc., 2005:19, 21).
Regional Wildlife Organizations (RWOs) and HTOs
While the land claim was being negotiated, the RWOs
were put in place to await expected injections of cash from
either the new Government of Nunavut (GN) or NTI, as had
happened with the regional community corporations. A
closer look at the NLCA document would have revealed that
the federal government had made no financial commitment
to fund either the RWOs or the HTOs and, because these are
not part of the GN’s public government structure, but
considered Inuit-only organizations, the GN Department of
Environment chose not to integrate them. Thus, when the
two organizations were overlooked, their status went into
limbo, and the staff was not held accountable for the limited
funding received from the NWMB (see Greer, 2006). Only
recently has NTI created a wildlife secretariat to oversee the
financial affairs of the RWOs and HTOs, but without any
formal government funding, the wildlife secretariat could
also turn out to be a meaningless gesture. Thus, Inuit in the
communities concluded that, in return for exclusion of the
HTOs from the official federal or territorial administration,
they had been given the right to harvest in all of Nunavut and
northern coastal Manitoba without the intrusive scrutiny of
the federal and provincial governments.
The capacity difficulties faced by HTOs and RWOs are
recounted by Blakney (2005): because of underfunding,
the salaried positions are poorly paid, and highly qualified
people quickly move elsewhere, leaving only members
who are undereducated for the tasks at hand. A language
barrier is often used as a tool to keep government and
academic researchers at a distance. On the other hand,
HTO members often feel that their advice, when given, is
not taken seriously, and that the southern researchers lack
the ability to understand Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit (IQ,
Inuit traditional knowledge) and the importance of what is
being said. They resent being asked to do what they
consider to be menial technical or administrative tasks.
The sentiment toward southern researchers and federal
departments often voiced by members is, “Let them come
here and do their own counting and record keeping.”
Blakney and Suluk (2006a) exposed irregularities in the
tabulation and reporting of harvesting records by local
hunters. An example is the differences between the num-
bers (the Arviat HTO and other Kivalliq HTOs) submitted
to the DFO and those sent to the NWHS (Table 3).
LEGACY OF NON-INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT
AND DIRECTION FOR GOVERNMENT
Most HTOs are composed of harvesters from the older
generations, who find resource management threatening.
Unfortunate historical incidents and governmental poli-
cies of the past are their primary points of reference when
dealing with the federal government and southern re-
searchers. Their perception of the federal government
and science researchers is that these people are coming to
number, regulate, restrict, impose quotas, and take away
Inuit control over their livelihoods. Most older Inuit
eschew involvement with researchers. As a result of the
recent romanticization of Inuit elders by many southern
and European academics and the subsequent hounding of
them by science researchers wishing to exploit profitable
pieces of Inuit knowledge, access to elders is often
carefully controlled. At times, IQ is strategically created
and filtered through politically astute interpreters to keep
researchers and government at a distance. More than a
few science researchers have experienced lost or inap-
propriately gathered samples, skewed reporting, mis-
leading or evasive responses to inquiries, escalating costs
for less and less work, and research results suppressed
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within the communities (see e.g., Anonymous, 2005;
Minogue, 2005).
The NWHS completed by the NWMB was understood
by many Inuit to contain sufficient information upon
which governments could make management decisions.
However, governments require ongoing monitoring and
continuous creation of simplified numerical data to con-
trol and govern populations and make them “legible”
(knowable to outsiders through records; Scott, 1998)—a
fact that has escaped the attention and understanding of
most Inuit. It therefore comes as no surprise that among
Inuit hunters, a lack of interest in reporting harvest kills is
a prevailing view.
The community harvesters’ negative views are encour-
aged by radio reports regarding the ongoing failure of the
federal and territorial governments and NTI to communi-
cate with each other. In 2005, former Chief Justice Thomas
Berger (Berger, 2005) chided both the NTI and the federal
government for their lack of mutual respect and under-
standing of the original aims when they negotiated a
comprehensive agreement. More recently, Inuit heard of
the sudden dissolution of the DFO-led integrated manage-
ment working group for Hudson Bay and the redirection of
all its financial, human, and technical resources to the
Beaufort area (Blakney, 2005). Although most Inuit did
not understand the complexity of these events, what they
did understand was that the government had abandoned
them and diverted its resources elsewhere.
It may seem to those less familiar with the dynamics of
northern communities that we are calling into question the
validity of the NWHS, which we consider to be a truly
momentous work. Or, it may seem that, like Howard and
Widdowson (1999), we are challenging the value and use
of IQ in management decision making, or advocating a
crackdown on management abuses, or taking a tough stand
against the hunters. We want to make it very clear that we
are not advocating these measures. Harsh policies, tough
regulations, stiff penalties, dismissal of IQ, imposition of
southern knowledge systems, and the disempowerment of
local people through bureaucratic and financial strangula-
tion are precisely what generated current conditions within
coastal communities. A more stringent application of those
policies and penalties will not lessen the resentment or
resistance of the older generations of harvesters and elders,
but only encourage more creative ways of amplifying their
resistance. On the other hand, unsupervised funding payouts
to independent and unaccountable organizations will not
foster better financial management or capacity building in
the communities.
What is relevant to lessening northern resistance and
building capacity in the communities is revealed by T.
Suluk’s comments (above) on the original thoughts and
purpose behind the comprehensive land claim, i.e., that the
last of the Inuit nomads wanted Canada to recognize their
cultural need to feel free (from external domination, regu-
lation, monitoring, surveillance, and policy makers) and to
have the option of retaining their land-based harvesting
lifestyle, while learning the skills necessary to bring eco-
nomic development and prosperity to the North and allow-
ing their children to become integrated into Western society.
Those needs, according to many Inuit, were only margin-
ally realized through the land claim.
Western concepts of ocean resource management (per-
haps more appropriately worded as the management of
harvesters who use ocean resources) and research con-
cerns about global warming are still relatively new to the
Arctic regions of Canada. It was only 35 to 40 years ago
that Canadian Inuit began to understand how events hap-
pening in faraway places could affect their region. Since
that time, Inuit have had to learn a second language, pick
and choose among different knowledge systems (Blakney
and Suluk, 2006b) and practices, try them out, and then
implement them. It has taken many years of trial and error
by Inuit leaders to determine which management models
to adopt, and then to promote those ideas to the people in
a language and concepts they trust and understand. What
the Inuit harvesters in Nunavut communities need now is
neither withdrawal or abandonment by governments nor
isolation from their land-claim organization, but the power
of self-determination and resource decision making, and
access to human, financial, technical, and cultural re-
sources to provide a comprehensive knowledge base on
which to make their decisions. This goal can be accom-
plished only through integrated management planning on
a consistent and long-term basis.
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